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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
l

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

:

Case No. S00045-CA

»

BRIAN E. KAGUIRE,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a denial of a motion to withdraw
a no contest plea to aggravated assault, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990), in the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the taking of defendant's plea of no contest

conform with legal requirements?

An appellate court "will not

interfere with a trial judge's determination that a defendant has
failed to show good cause [for withdrawal of a guilty plea]
unless it clearly appears that the trial judge abused his
discretion."
2.

State v. Mildenhally 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987).
Did the trial court have jurisdiction to hear

defendant's motion to withdraw his no contest plea, and does the
Utah Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over defendant's appeal
from denial of his motion?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1)(Supp. 1990):
The district court has original jurisdiction
in all matters civil and criminal, not
excepted in the Utah Constitution and not
prohibited by law.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 1990):
The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over
. . .

(f) appeals from district court in
criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction of a first degree or capital
felony;
Utah Code Ann. § 77~35-ll(e) (Supp. 1988) (amended
1989, repealed eff. July 1, 1990).*
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty or no contest and shall not accept
such a plea until the court has made the
findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not
represented by counsel he has knowingly
waived his right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a
jury trial and to confront and cross-examine
in open court the witnesses against him, and
that by entering the plea he waives all of
those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
Effective April 24, 1989, former rule 11(e) was redesignated as
rule 11(5).
-2-

all those elements;
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon
him for each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result
of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been
reached.
If it appears that the prosecuting
attorney or any other party has agreed to
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea
to a lesser included offense, or the
dismissal of other charges, the same shall be
approved by the court. If recommendations as
to sentence are allowed by the court, the
court shall advise the defendant personally
that any recommendation as to sentence is not
binding on the court.
STATEMENT OF CASE
On January 21, 1988, defendant was charged with
aggravated assault, a £hird degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 75-5-103 (1990); mayhem, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-105 (1990); and being a
habitual criminal, a first degree felony, *in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990)(R. 31). On March 4, 1988, defendant
pleaded not guilty to all charges.

On April 21, 1988, defendant

executed an affidavit and entered a no contest plea to the charge
of aggravated assault (R. 111-12); (transcript of plea hearing
(hereinafter "T.M) 8). The other two charges were withdrawn on
the same date (T. 9). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the
prosecution recommended to the trial court that defendant be
sentenced for the offense as a class A misdemeanor (T. 11). The
trial court accepted the prosecution's recommendation and

-3-

sentenced defendant to one year in the Salt Lake County Jail with
credit for 30 days served (T. 14-15).

Defendant chose to serve

his sentence at the Utah State Prison (T. 15), and he completed
his term on or about March 22, 1989.

Defendant filed a motion to

withdraw his guilty plea on August 10, 1988 (R. 124-29).

On

November 30, 1989, a hearing was held on defendant's motion, and
on December 1, 1989 the trial court denied the motion (R. 2412
43).

The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of

law, and signed the order on December 15, 1989 (R. 256-60).
Defendant filed his notice of appeal on January 10, 1990 (R. 26364).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 21, 1988, defendant entered a no contest plea
to one count of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990).

Defendant's plea

was entered as the result of a plea agreement in which, in
exchange for defendant's plea, the prosecution agreed to move to
dismiss charges of mayhem, a second degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann § 76-5-105 (1990), and of being a habitual
criminal, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 76-8-1001 (1990), and to recommend that defendant be sentenced
as though the offense were a class A misdemeanor (T. 2-3, R.
112)•

The charge had resulted from an incident in which

defendant allegedly assaulted his grandmother, ripping off part
Judge James S. Sawaya presided over defendant's guilty plea
proceeding but recused himself after defendant filed his motion
to withdraw the plea (R. 217). The case was reassigned to Judge
Richard H. Moffat.
-4-

of her ear and inflicting other injuries (R. 31).
At the hearing on defendant's no contest plea defendant
signed a standard affidavit explaining to him his rights, in
conformity rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (a copy
of the affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum A ) .

The

transcript of the hearing reflects that defendant was told the
acts he committed which gave rise to the charges (T. 3); that, by
virtue of his prior not guilty plea, he was presumed innocent
until he had been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (Id.);
that the State had the burden of proving each element of each
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt (T. 3-4,7); that
defendant had no burden to prove his innocence (T. 4); that
defendant had a right to a trial by jury (Id.); that the court
treated a no contest plea the same as a guilty plea (.Id.); and
that the court was not,bound by the prosecution's recommendation
concerning sentencing (T. 5). Defendant stated that he had read
and understood the affidavit he was signing and the rights,
elements of the crime and facts giving rise to the charges, as
set forth in that affidavit (T. 6-7). Defendant also testified
that he understood the penalties for the offense of a third
degree felony and that he was signing the affidavit of his own
free will without force, coercion or threat (T. 5,8). After
signing the affidavit, defendant entered a no contest plea (Id.).
Defendant waived the statutory time limit for
sentencing and was sentenced, as recommended by the prosecution,
to a term of one year with a credit of 30 days, as though he had
pleaded no contest to a class A misdemeanor charge (T. 9, 14).

-5-

In a discussion regarding defendant's sentencing, defendant's
counsel, with defendant present, discussed defendant's parole
status.

She stated, in pertinent part, "[t]he Board of Pardons

will have to consider some technical matters, violations as well
as this new conviction, and they will no doubt give him some more
time than that [referring to the class A misdemeanor sentence]. .

At the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his
plea, defendant testified that he had not read the affidavit he
had signed at the time of his plea (transcript of hearing on
motion to withdraw plea (hereinafter "TA.") 49) but admitted to
having testified to the contrary at the plea hearing (TA. 51-52).
He testified to his belief that he was entering a contract with
the "Executive Branch" of the Utah State government and that any
agreement he made in his plea was binding on both the county
attorney and Adult Probation and Parole, as agents of the
"Executive Branch" (TA. 53-54).

Defendant also asserted, without

offering documentary or other evidence, tfiat his parole from the
Utah State Prison was revoked solely as a result of the
conviction arising from his no contest plea (TA. 54). He stated
that he was coerced into entering the plea (TA. 57). Defendant
did not testify to and no other evidence was offered asserting
any deficiencies in the taking of the no contest plea.
In denying defendant's motion, the trial court
concluded, inter alia, that defendant's plea was entered
knowingly and voluntarily and that the State of Utah had kept
good faith with defendant and delivered each of its promises made

-6-

to defendant up through sentencing (R. 258) (a copy of the
findings of fact and conclusions of law is attached hereto as
Addendum B ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
withdraw his no contest plea because the plea was knowingly and
voluntarily made and defendant received the benefit of his
bargain in the plea.

Both the trial court and this court have

excercised their jurisdiction properly in hearing this matter.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS NO CONTEST PLEA.
On appeal defendant asserts three bases for reversing
the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his no contest
plea.

First, in response to this court's holding in State v.

Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988)# defendant states that the trial court
improperly applied the "record as a whole" analysis in
determining the validity of his plea.

Second, defendant states

that the court did not comply with rule 11(e)(4), which requires
that a defendant understand the nature and elements of an offense
and that a plea is an admission of those elements, arguing that
he did not admit to the offense and that he did not know what
caused the injury to the victim (Br. of App. at 25, 26).
Finally, defendant asserts that he did not receive the benefit of
his bargain in the trial court's sentencing.

-7-

With regard to defendant's "strict compliance" with
rule 11(e) argument, the State is aware of this Court's recent
decisions concerning withdrawal of guilty pleas. This Court has
made it clear in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.
App.)#

cert

- denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); State v.

Valencia/ 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Gentry,
141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. August 24, 1990); and State
v. Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep, 35 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1990),
that it will apply an on-the-record "strict compliance" with rule
11(e) test in assessing the validity of a guilty plea,
interpreting State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), as
creating a substantively new rule in guilty plea cases and
replacing the prior "record as a whole" test.

If this Court

applies an on-the-record "strict compliance" test to the instant
case, it will undoubtedly find that the trial court did not
conduct the complete on-the-record review with defendant of the
rule 11(e) requirements as mandated by Vasilacopulos, Valencia,
Gentry and Pharris.
As set forth in its briefs in those cases, the State
believes that Gibbons did not substantively change the rule on
withdrawal of guilty pleas and that the "record as a whole" test
still governs the plea withdrawals.

Consequently, the State has

several cases pending before the Utah Supreme Court on this
issue.

Until the issue is

finally resolved by that court, the

3

State v. Hoff, No. 900096 (Appellee's brief filed June 25,
1990), is currently before the Utah Supreme Court, and the State
is petitioning for writs of certiorari in Gentry and Pharris (a
copy of the Gentry petition is attached hereto and incorporated
herein as Addendum C ) .
-8-

State will continue to urge that this Court reconsider the
"record as a whole" test and will continue to assert the
4
correctness of that standard.

In the instant case the record as

a whole amply supports the trial court's ruling that defendant's
plea was knowing and voluntary.
Second, defendant asserts that he did not admit to the
offense and that he did not know what had happened to injure the
victim (Br. of App. at 26). A no contest plea does not require
that defendant admit to the offense.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-13-2(3) (1990):
A plea of no contest indicates the accused
does not challenge the charges in the
information or indictment and if accepted by
the court shall have the same effect as a
plea of guilty and imposition of sentence may
be rendered in the same manner as if a plea
of guilty had been entered.
Rule 11(e)(4) requires that defendant understand the
nature and elements of the offense. At defendant's plea hearing,
his attorney stated the factual basis and the elements of the
offense, as follows:
MS. LOY: . . . The factual basis I have
placed in the fact slot [of defendant's
affidavit] is he recklessly injured his
grandmother by his actions while intoxicated
which caused serious permanent disfigurement
of her ear and the elements of aggravated
assault are that he attempted with unlawful
force or violence to recklessly do bodily
injury to another by means likely to produce
bodily injury.

4
Although the State concedes that, in light of Gentry and
Pharris, this Court is unlikely to retreat from its conclusion
that the record as a whole test no longer governs, it believes
that continued argument on this point is necessary to preserve
the issue for possible certiorari review.
-9-

(T. 2-3). That is a correct statement of both the nature and the
elements of the offense.

See In re McElhaney, 549 P.2d 328 (Utah

1978) ("reckless conduct using means or force likely to produce
serious bodily injury constitutes aggravated assault under
subsection (l)(b) . • . M ) .

Defendant testified that he
5

understood the elements as stated in the affidavit,

and he did

not challenge the factual basis of the charge (T. 6-7). Thus,
the trial court complied with rule 11(e)(4) and section 77-132(3) requirements.

Defendant's argument is groundless.

Defendant's final assertion, that he did not get the
benefit of his bargain in the sentencing, is also groundless.
The plea agreement was that the State would recommend that
defendant be sentenced as though the offense were a class A
misdemeanor (T. 2-3). The trial court told defendant that it was
not bound by the recommendation, and defendant stated that he
understood (T. 5). Defendant's attorney openly stated in court
that defendant would "no doubt" be given more time in prison
after his parole hearing, and defendant did not object (T. 11)•
The trial court sentenced defendant as though the offense were a
class A misdemeanor, in accordance with the State's
recommendations (T. 14). The trial court so found (R. 258).
Defendant received the full benefit of his plea bargain.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT AND THIS COURT HAVE PROPERLY
EXERCISED THEIR JURISDICTION.

Defense counsel's statement of the nature and elements of the
offense is nearly a verbatim recitation of the same in
defendant's affidavit.
-10-

Defendant argues that the trial court did not establish
subject matter jurisdiction at the change of plea (Br. of App. at
32).

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (Supp. 1990) , n[t]he

district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and

criminalr

not Excepted

prohibited by law."

in the Utah Constitution

and not

Neither the Utah Constitution nor other law

divests the district court of its jurisdiction over defendant's
change of plea.

His assertion to the contrary is meritless.

Defendant states that this court has jurisdiction to
reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw the
plea (Br. of App. at 33). The State agrees.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm the tri^l court's denial of defendant's motion td withdraw
his no contest plea.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

day of October,

1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

^JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to Brian
E. Maguire, p_ro se, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah
day of October, 1990.

_
-11-

.

84020, this
4 /O

•

/

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

«...

.

UJ.'III

—~—••"'

In the District Court of the
State
St; of Utah
THE STATE PFMTAH,
)
n -

v$, . .

-

)

,j& ' ^ - f r ^
/

istri

^ R 21

,988

KSS
crimintlNo

/

^~ . f \ \P^<^^^—,,nA^T

flBp IN CLERKS OFFICE
^Rr: Lake County Utah

I ^ H

Affidavit of Defendant

dfruu/n, £ ' / T W A ^ ^ \
Defendant

I

PK-^-7'7

oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of

^mHytothecharge<s) of:

^0
.

(Name vf Crime)

.AL€^.'^yiMiffiXKjJz

'A^A'^A1^

\rfjjU'^ JOSJIM^Xwtl*

I have received a copy of the charge (Information) and understand the crimj I arp pleading-gmft? to is a
(Degree of Felony or Class of
,e may be
P'^T^Jj/K^Q U
and understand the punishment for this crime
_, , .
.rprison term sA,fe&>QJ^Hi-.y c* -^/tine, or both. ! am ..„..
My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am represented by Attorney
who has explained my rights to me and I understand them.
1. I know that I have a con$titutio*alright to plead not guilty and tp have a jury trial upon the charge to which I
have entered a plea o f ^ w t ^ o r t o a trial by a judge should I desire.
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial. I have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also
know that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if I choose not to do so. the jury will be told that this may not be held
against me.
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every dement of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guilty must be by a
complete agreement of all jurors.
4. I know that under the constitution that I have a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I choose
to do so.
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the
State without cost to me.
7—7
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea
of-gu&y 1I am
?iea ot~gt*Mty
amgiving
givingup
upmy
myconstitutional
constitutionalrights
ngntsas
asset
setout
outininthe
the
preceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting
ifrgj-agrv-guhy erf thewjMfTir^l.itjh ms pka uf guiltj u umtialr/SyV, lu
7. I also know that if I am on probation, parole,
or awaitinSentencing
awaitin^entencing upon
uporfaanother offense of whifch I have been
>le. or
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me.
\J%~J

O

JIU

JL +*.

A. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea ofgmff does not mean that the Judge will not impose either a fine
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and ml |>l llllUllI llU'P UjCWI UiaUi.^Lja^e^y^wrMong ^ ta whmciii •JtuHL?Uj^glIl

A

9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made lo induce me to plead |4*fejP^ollowingother charges
pending against me, to-wit: (Court case numberts) or coum(s)):
" ^ ^^X/LAfi^rv-s^^
/ /

V

c

will be dismissed, and that no other charge(s) will be Hied against me for other crimes I may have committed which
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made
or sought by either defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by
the Judge, &M: &^ £*LCUMAfa ^s^Uk
&LS«M
i^l^^cKi V J
I have read this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I knov^and und<
erstand its contents. 1
years of
of ape
age. have
have attended
attended school
school through
through the
the lol
am *-^ / . vears
understand the English language.
Dated this

day of.

vWvM.

Q^S^

19

t

can read and

9?

./Defendant
Defendant

Subscribed and sworn to before me

^-N/I

.day of.

H DtXON HHNDLEY

-

s

•JL»*f

/^T^r^^^
Judge
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY:
the defendant named above and I know he
I certify that I am the attorney for.
has read the Affidavit, or that 1 have read it to him, and I discussed it with him and believe he fully understands the
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements,
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are in ail respects accurate and true.

Defense Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY:
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against &A^a. >K_
±S-defendant.
ecu rate. No improper
I have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are true and accurate.
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable cause to
believe the evidence would support the conviction of thejdefendant for the plea offered, and that acceptance of the plea
would serve the public interest.
7

4^H24^
Prosecuting Attorney

ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's pleajof^Guiltv~ to the charge, set forth in the
Affidavit be accepted and entered.
s*\s
>r- >7
Done in Court this

ADDENDUM B

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
JAMES M. COPE, Bar No. 0726
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

L. ;•
^ ^ *1
^^J^C^o
^^
B;
'
U

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. CR88-377

BRIAN E. MAGUIRE,
Honorable RICHARD H. MOFFAT
Defendant.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Defendant
his

plea

commenced

of no contest,

these

entered

proceedings
in open

by claiming

court

while

he

that
was

represented by counsel, could be withdrawn by him because:

1)

The plea was not entered voluntarily;

or
2)
The consideration for the plea, a
promise by the State to limit the punishment
to that of a Class A Misdemeanor, was
destroyed by subsequent actions of the Parole
Board; or
3) The facts admitted by the defendant
during the plea proceedings did not describe
the statutory elements of the offense to
which he plead guilty.
A review of the Affidavit of the Defendant, Transcript of
the plea proceedings, the written and oral arguments of counsel, as
well as the documents contained in the court's file of this matter

1.
Mayhem,

Defendant

a Second

Degree Felony.
allege

that

was

Degree

charged

Felony,

on

December

and Aggravated

7,

1987

Assault,

with

a Third

This Information was amended on January 6, 1988 to

in

addition

to

the

above

charges,

defendant

was a

Habitual Criminal - a First Degree Felony.
2.

On March 4, 1988, after a preliminary hearing of the

State's evidence, defendant pled not guilty to all of the charges
against him.
3.
indicated

Sometime

on

or

after

at at Pre-Trial Conference

April

18,

1988,

defendant

that he would, on April 21,

1988, enter a plea to one of the charges listed in the Information.
4.
-Affidavit
document
to

The

defendant

of Defendant"

executed

on April

a two

21, 1989

page

document

in open

recited that the knew of his consitutional

waive

them

voluntarily,

and

understood

the

headed

court.

This

rights, chose

consequences

of

entering a plea of no contest to the charge of Aggravated Assault.
There

was

no

faculties.

evidence

defendant

Additionally,

was

the document

r>ot

in

control

of

his

recited that the State had

agreed to recommend that the sentence to be imposed not exceed that
of a Class A Misdemeanor.
5.

The

State

did

make

such

a recommendation,

defendant

did receive the benefit of that

sentenced

to 1 year

in the County

granted by the sentencing
request

recommendation.

Jail, with

and

the

He was

thirty days credit

judge, who also allowed the defendant's

to serve this time at the prison.

Defendant

exhibited a

sophisticated understanding of the workings of the Board of Pardons
during the proceedings on that day.

6.

Defendant

admitted

during

the above proceeding

that

he had recklessly caused injury to his grandmother

by permanently

disfiguring her ear, causing serious bodily injury.

Defendant now

admits

that

his

grandmother

is

dead.

This

would

make

her

unavailable as a witness if the case were to be tried.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I.

The permanent disfigurement

bodily

injury.

injury

to

employed

another
to

caused it.
admitted

One

who

is

achieve

even

guilty
that

recklessly

of

result

Aggravated
were

of an ear is a serious
causes

serious

Assault

reasonably

if

the means

likely

See McElhanev, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah, 1978)

bodily

to

have

The defendant

all of the elements of the offense of aggravated

assault

during the proceedings relative to his plea on April 21, 1988, even
though he may not have had an exact mental image of what he did to
his grandmother.
II.

The

defendant's

plea

was

entered

knowingly

and

voluntarily.
III. The State of Utah was not required by the terms and
conditions of the plea bargain to intercede on defendant's behalf
with the Board of Pardons.
the

defendant

and

The State of Utah kept good faith with

delivered

on

defendant up through sentencing.

each

of

the

promises

made

to

No agreement in the Affidavit of

Defendant was breached or avoided by the State of Utah.
IV.

The defendant has already served the entire sentence

which resulted from the nolo plea he now seeks to set aside.

CONCLUSION
There is no factual, legal, statutory or equitable reason
to allow defendant to set aside the plea of no contest he entered
on April 21, 1988, in open court before Judge James S. Sawaya.
DATED this

/Jx

day of December, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILIN

I

hereby

certify

/ ;.--

that on this

day of December,

1989, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order to Connie Mower, Attorney for
Defendant, at the address stated below.

.1 4

•'n"

r

l

X

'

Secretary

CONNIE MOWER
Attorney for the Defendant
623 East 100 South
P.O. Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643
JMC/jp/158
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ADDENDUM C

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

I

Plaintiff-Petitioner, :
v.

i

FRANK DAVID GENTRY,

:

Case No.

Category No. 13

Defendant-Respondent. :
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole question presented for review is whether the
court of appeals erroneously held that State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d
1309 (Utah 1987), adopted a "strict compliance" with rule 11(5),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which supersedes the "record as
a whole" test traditionally applied on review to determine
whether a guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on August 24,
1990, and appears in State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah
Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1990) (a copy of the court's opinion is
contained in the addendum).
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition
under Utah Code Ann. $ 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Frank David Gentry, was charged with theft
by deception, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. $ 76-6405 (1990), and criminal trespass, a class C misdemeanor, under
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-206 (1990).
After defendant pled not guilty to the charges, trial
commenced before the district court sitting without a jury.
After the close of the evidence, but prior to closing arguments,
defendant changed his plea from not guilty to guilty of theft, a
third degree felony.
charge.

The State dismissed the criminal trespass

The trial court stayed imposition of sentence and placed

defendant on eighteen months' probation.
Over two months after the acceptance of his guilty
plea, defendant moved to withdraw it.

The trial court denied

this motion.
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea
and remanded the case for a new trial on .the original charges.
State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. Aug. 24,
1990).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A recitation of the facts of defendant's crimes is not
necessary for purposes of this petition.

The relevant facts are

those stated above in the Statement of the Case.

The facts underlying the charges against defendant are
accurately summarized in the court of appeals' opinion. Gentry,
141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26-27.
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT
STATE V. GIBBONS, 740 P.2D 1309 (UTAH 1987),
ADOPTED A TEST OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE
11(5), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
WHICH SUPERSEDES THE "RECORD AS A WHOLE" TEST
TRADITIONALLY APPLIED ON REVIEW TO DETERMINE
WHETHER A GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY AND
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED.
On appeal to the court of appeals, defendant argued,
inter alia/ that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because "the trial court
failed to explain to [him] the elements and facts of the crime of
theft before he pled guilty, and . . . further erred by relying
on an incomplete record as a substitute for Rule 11 compliance[]
in determining that [he] entered his plea with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences."

State v. Gentry, 141 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 27. The State responded that, under the "record as
a whole" test traditionally applied by this Court on postconviction review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea, see,
e.g., Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,
110 S. Ct. 751 (1990); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah
1988); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per
2
curiam), the trial court had not abused its discretion.

The -record as a whole" test was stated in Miller as follows:
[T]he absence of a finding under [rule 11] is
not critical BO long as the record as a whole
affirmatively establishes that the defendant
entered his plea with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences and of the
rights he was waiving.
718 P.2d at 405.
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In reversing and remanding to allow defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea, the court of appeals definitively
rejected the State's argument that the "record as a whole*1 test
applied, concluding that in State v. Gibbons# this Court
"effectively replac[ed] the 'record as a whole' test with a
strict Rule 11(5) compliance test in accepting a defendant's
guilty plea,"

Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28—i.e., if the

trial court has not strictly complied with rule 11(5), the guilty
plea, although perhaps otherwise voluntary, must automatically be
vacated.

This conclusion misconstrues Gibbons and ignores

significant language in both pre-Gibbons and post-Gibbons
opinions of this Court that clearly cuts against the notion that
Gibbons abandoned the record as a whole tfest for determining the
voluntariness, and thus validity, of a guilty plea.
In Gibbons, this Court did not review either the trial
court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or the
voluntariness of the defendant's guilty pleas.

Rather, the

Court, in the context of remanding the case because an attack on
the voluntariness of a guilty plea must first be presented to the
trial court in the form of a motion to withdraw, concluded that
"a statement of the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in
all trial courts in this state is appropriate."
P.2d at 1312.

Gibbons, 740

It then set out the specific requirements for

taking of guilty pleas under rule 11 for the purpose of assisting
the trial court on remand in determining the validity of the
defendant'8 pleas.

Ibid.

The Gibbons Court did not even mention

the record as a whole test for determining voluntariness of a
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guilty plea, and the reason seems obvious:

the Court was not

reviewing the trial court record to determine the voluntariness
of the defendant's pleas.

Thus, the court of appeals' conclusion

that Gibbons replaced the record as a whole test with a strict
compliance test reads far too much into Gibbons.

The Gibbons

Court simply did not address that issue.
Furthermore, certain language in several post-Gibbons
opinions of this Court strongly suggests that the record as a
whole test was not modified by Gibbons.

For example, in Jolivet

v. Cook, this Court stated:
We first address Jolivet's claim that his
guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary.
Specifically, Jolivet argues that Judge Burns
erred in the taking of his guilty pleas
because he did not make findings that Jolivet
understood the elements of each crime charged
and how those elements related to the facts,
as required by State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d
1309 (Utah 1987), or that Jolivet knew the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences. In fact, Jolivet claims that he
did not know or understand these things when
he entered his pleas.
[Rule 11(5)(d)] requires that before a
trial court accepts a guilty plea, it must
find that the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which
he or she is entering the plea. In Gibbons,
this Court stated that in making this
finding, the trial court must ensure that the
defendant understands "the elements of the
crimes charged and the relationship of the
law to the facts." Id. at 1312. In
addition, [rule 11(5)(e)] requires that
before the trial court accepts a guilty plea,
it must find that the defendant knows of the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences. The record clearly shows that at
the time the guilty pleas were accepted,
Judge Burns did not make the findings
required by [rule 11(5)], i.e., that Jolivet
understood the elements of each crime charged
and how these elements related to the facts
-5-

and that Jolivet knew the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences.
However, this Court has held, *[T]he absence
of a finding under [rule 11] is not critical
so long as the record as a whole
affirmatively establishes that the defendant
entered his plea with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences and of the
rights he was waiving.- State v. Miller, 718
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris,
709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985); Warner v.
Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985).
784 P.2d at 1149-50 (footnotes omitted).

And in State v.

Copeland, the Court, without citing Gibbons, said:
The United States Supreme Court has said,
[T]here is no adequate substitute for
demonstrating in the record at the time the
plea is entered the defendant's understanding
of the nature of the charge against him."
McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 470, 89 S.Ct. at 1173
(emphasis in the original). We think the
most effective way to do this is to have the
defendant state*in his own words his
understanding of the offense and the actions
which make him guilty of the offense. By
this statement, the trial court can assure
itself that the defendant is truly submitting
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the
record on appeal will clearly reflect the
defendant'8 understanding. Although this
method is therefore preferable to others, it
is not absolutely required. The test is
voluntariness. We hold that the record
demonstrates that defendant admitted acts
sufficient to justify his conviction of the
offense to which he pleaded guilty.
M

765 P.2d at 1273 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
Although both Jolivet and Copeland involved pre-Gibbons
guilty pleas, Gentryf 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, this Court did
not note or attach any significance to that fact in either
opinion, and, in fact, directly applied Gibbons in Jolivet in
concluding that although the trial court did not strictly comply
with rule 11, the record as a whole demonstrated that Jolivet
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entered his guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily.
P.2d at 1149-51.

Jolivet, 784

This seriously undermines the court of appeals'

effort to distinguish Jolivet and Copeland on the basis that the
record as a whole test was applied in those cases because they
involved pre-Gibbons guilty pleas.

Significantly, in State v.

Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989), which involved a post-Gibbons
guilty plea, this Court apppeared to apply the record as whole
test in reversing the trial court's denial of the defendant's
4
motion to withdraw.
Finally, that the record as a whole test represents the
most reasonable standard upon which to assess a post-conviction
attack on the voluntariness of a guilty plea is made clear in the
following passage from State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986):
A final word on the State's Rule 11
arguments. In its zeal to set aside Kay's
guilty pleas or renege on the bargain that
was struck, the State has argued, in effect,
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty
pleas should always be voided when the trial
court violates any provision of Rule 11. The
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall and
Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well.
This position is shortsighted, for to follow

It is not clear what significance State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d
670 (Utah 1989) (per curiam), which was issued five days before
Jolivet, has in this inquiry. Unlike Jolivet, Hickman declined
to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons guilty plea on the ground that
Gibbons represented a clear break from the past and would
therefore not be applied retroactively. Hickman, 779 P.2d at 672
n.l. Insofar as Hickman might be read to support the court of
appeals' strict compliance test, it is inconsistent with Jolivet
and should not be followed.
4
The court of appeals obviously disagrees with this reading of
Smith, having cited it in support of its decision in the instant
case, Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, and stating directly in
State v. Pharris, Case No. 890549-CA, slip op. at 8 n.6 (Utah Ct.
App. Sept. 14, 1990), a case issued after Gentry, that Smith
applied the "strict compliance test articulated in Gibbons."
-7-

it would be to sanction a remedy far worse
than the wrong* If we were to to hold any
violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the
resultant plea, even when the plea is
knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would
encourage defendant's, convicted and
sentenced after such a plea, to attack their
convictions for purely tactical reasons,
either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas
corpus long after the fact. We have refused
to overturn convictions upon such challenges
in the past, e.g., State v. Knowles, Utah,
709 P.2d 311 (1985); State v. Morris, Utah,
709 P.2d 310 (1985), [sic] and we find no
reason to encourage such attacks in the
future.
Overturning such convictions—which we
would have to do if we embraced the rationale
advanced by the State and the Chief Justice's
concurring opinion—would require the State
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably
long after the challenged guilty pleas were
entered and when the passage of time would
make reprosecution impractical,'if not
impossible. Almost certainly, the ultimate
result would be to free a number of convicted
persons for nothing more than technical
errors in the acceptance of their voluntary
guilty pleas.
717 P.2d at 1301-02 (footnote omitted) . This view is consistent
with the harmless error rule long recognized by this court in a
variety of contexts.

See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071

Most jurisdictions apply a record as a whole test rather than
the strict compliance rule adopted by the court of appeals. See,
e.g., United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1990)
(district court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 does
not warrant reversal where defendant's knowledge of rights waived
was otherwise apparent); Wood v. State, 190 Ga.App. 179, 378
S.E.2d 520 (6a. App. 1989) (where defendant was otherwise
informed of rights waiyed, harmless error standard is applied to
trial court's failure to comply with rule governing taking of
pleas); People v. Bettistea, 181 Mich.App. 194, 448 N.W.2d 781,
783 (Mich. App. 1989) ("record as a wholeH demonstrated that plea
was made knowingly and voluntarily); People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d
9, 459 N.E.2d 170 (N.Y. 1983) (voluntariness of plea determined
by considering all relevent circumstances surrounding it, not by
judge's ritualistic recitation of rights waived).
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(Utah 1989) (harmless error standard for nonconstitutional
error); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (Utah 1989) ("with
respect to certain constitutional errors, we must place on the
State the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt").

See also Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R.

Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 61.

Interestingly, the court of

appeals did not so much as mention Kay, even though the State
cited the foregoing quoted language from Kay to it in its brief.
See State v. Gentry, Case No. 890145-CA, Br. of Appellee at 1718.
In sum, a careful reading of Gibbons and this Court's
pre- and post-Gibbons decisions indicates that the court of
appeals erred in holding that Gibbons replaced the record as a
whole test with a strict compliance test.

A strict compliance

test is not required either by Gibbons or logic.
Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari because
the court of appeals has rendered a decision on a question of law
which is in conflict with decisions of this Court.
P. 46(b).

Utah R. App.

Insofar as the issue of what standard applies on

review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea is unsettled in
light of Gibbons, certiorari should be granted because the court
of appeals has decided an important question of law which should
be settled by this Court.

Utah R. App. P. 46(d).
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